Ignorancia culpable: una perspectiva internalista a partir de creencias disposicionales para el contexto tecnológico
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La ignorancia es, a menudo, una excusa válida que disculpa una acción incorrecta. Pero autores como William FitzPatrick argumentaron que la ignorancia es culpable si se podía esperar razonablemente que el agente tomara medidas que la hubieran corregido o evitado, dadas sus capacidades y las oportunidades que brinda el contexto, pero no lo hizo por vicios como la pereza, la indiferencia, el desdén, etc. La ignorancia culpable sigue estando presente en el debate y, en los últimos tiempos, se ha vuelto más acuciante con el problema de la responsabilidad tecnológica. En este trabajo se adopta una perspectiva internalista de la ignorancia culpable, para analizar una forma de distribución de la culpabilidad, en el contexto tecnológico, basada en creencias disposicionales. Así, se encuentran dos tipos de responsabilidad. Al examinar las implicaciones de la ignorancia culpable, nos damos cuenta de que podemos responder a la idea inequívoca de que un ingeniero es moral y epistémicamente responsable de ciertos hechos.
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