The political party as a decisive actor in media regulation. The communication policies of the Frente Amplio governments in Uruguay

Abstract

The Frente Amplio governments in Uruguay promoted communication policies that reduced the weight of the large private media conglomerates and legally recognized new players. Although other South American leftist governments did the same at the beginning of the 21st century, the Uruguayan particularity is that this took place without public confrontation between the government and media companies. This article explores how this atypical combination was possible. It explores communication policies between 2005 and 2015 through a process-tracing strategy focusing on the interactions between the actors involved. In the analyzed decade, governments negotiated their media appearances in ways they considered convenient and media conglomerates, which perceived themselves as weaker than the government, managed to negotiate regulation policies and preserve part of the status quo. Faced with this panorama, neither of the two actors sought to break the relationship. However, there was a third actor: the Frente Amplio, the ruling party, which from its central position, atypical for South America, played a defining role in communication policies. First, during the government of Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2010), and against the president›s will, it acted as a veto player to prevent the entry of large media conglomerates in telecommunications and to protect Antel, the leading state-owned company in telephone and internet services. Second, it was the driving force behind a law for audiovisual communication services, which, although it did not have a clear impetus from President José Mujica (2010-2015), was approved by his government.