Cooperativas, libertad y eficiencia
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Las cooperativas de trabajadoras son deseables porque otorgan control democrático a sus trabajadoras y pueden operar eficientemente. Para defender esta doble tesis, el artículo procede del siguiente modo. Primero, ofrece una justificación del control democrático de la empresa a partir de la filosofía política republicana. La rendición de cuentas democrática permite que las empresas se organicen internamente por medio de gerentes y directoras que tengan que atender a los intereses de las trabajadoras. Segundo, el artículo analiza la relevancia normativa que tiene la eficiencia. El punto central es que las empresas existen porque organizan la producción más eficientemente que una serie de intercambios entre contratistas independientes. Esto indica que las cooperativas al menos deben cumplir con este margen de eficiencia. Tercero, se argumenta que la evidencia disponible es compatible con pensar que las cooperativas son eficientes y que sus dificultades de financiación podrían mitigarse cambiando las condiciones institucionales de trasfondo.
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Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca
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